Philosophy

DoD has an active CB defense program as well as a passive defense program (DoD, 1996). The active program involves improving capabilities for detecting, tracking, identifying, intercepting, destroying, and neutralizing NBC warheads delivered by airborne launch platforms, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, while minimizing collateral effects. The passive defense program involves protecting against the effects of CB weapons. The passive defense programs includes: (1) contamination avoidance (reconnaissance, detection, and warning); (2) force protection (individual protection, collective protection, and medical support); and (3) decontamination.

Contamination avoidance includes sensors for joint task forces, mobile CB reconnaissance, and systems capable of detecting multiple CB agents and characterizing new agents. Technological advances to support this policy include remote detectors, miniaturization, lower detection limits, logistics support, and biological detection capability.

In force protection, improved mask systems and advanced protective clothing are being developed under a joint program to reduce the weight, heat stress, and logistics burden of current gear. (See Chapter 4 for a description.) Medical research is directed toward improving prophylaxes, antidotes, treatments, vaccines, and medical casualty management. Other research is focused on lightweight CB protective shelters and collective protection technologies (see Chapter 4).

In decontamination, modular systems are being developed, and new technologies, such as sorbents, catalytic coatings, and the physical removal of contaminants, are being developed (DoD, 1996).

RDT&E and procurement budgets for the joint service CB defense program have steadily increased from about $388 million in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to the current level of $645 million in FY 1999 (DoD, 1999). Figure 3-1 provides a summary of appropriated and requested funding from FY 1996 to FY 2005. As the funding profiles show, funding levels for the science and technology base (i.e., basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development) are relatively stable. Based on these figures and the funds for individual protection, collective protection, and decontamination technologies (see Appendix A for a detailed breakout of the funds), new technologies for physical protection and decontamination are not likely to be developed.

Figure 3-1

Summary of appropriations for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

DoD established an integrated CB defense program under the oversight of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for CounterProliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense (DATSD [CP/CBD]). This program was created to consolidate, coordinate, and integrate the CB defense requirements of all services into a single program. DoD also established the Counterproliferation Support Program specifically to address shortfalls in operational capabilities. The Counterproliferation Support Program supports the following existing programs to accelerate the deployment of essential military counterproliferation technologies and capabilities: (1) a program to accelerate (by up to six years) the fielding of an advanced, long-range, eye-safe, infrared LIDAR (laser detection device) to provide long-range battlefield warning of CB agents; (2) a program to evaluate the use of ultraviolet multifrequency lasers to detect and characterize biological agents by their fluorescent spectra; (3) a program to develop miniaturized CB extremely sensitive point detectors that can be installed on unmanned aerial vehicles; (4) a program to accelerate (by two years) the procurement of improved PPE and CPE; (5) a program to expand the technology base for decontamination; and (6) a program to improve joint NBC doctrine and training procedures by improving battlefield simulations (DoD, 1996). Approximately $30 million was budgeted in FY 1996 to support these programs. In addition, the Counterproliferation Support Program supports the activities of the CB defense program and facilitates the collection of information on proliferant states.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency carries out the CB technology development activities (referred to as the "tech base") for the DATSD (CP/CBD) through the Joint Technology Panel for Chemical and Biological Defense. The CB tech base includes programs for the development of active defenses and a number of passive defenses. The Army's programs also include the operation of Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, as the primary test range for CB defensive equipment. Details on CB testing at Dugway can be found in reports by the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee issued in May 1995 and 1997 (DoD, 1995, 1997a).

Chemical/Biological Warfare Doctrine

Chemical/Biological Warfare Training

Once the new doctrine of contamination avoidance (with concomitant detection and chemical protective equipment) was adopted, training was naturally modified to implement it. A critical requirement for deterring the use of CB agents (and for successful operations if deterrence fails) is that forces be fully trained to respond to the full spectrum of CB threats. At the most basic level, CB training includes learning how to don boots, gloves, masks, and overgarments and how to conduct battlefield operations in a CB environment using protective equipment. Training requires repetition and commitment on the part of unit commanders and is relatively straightforward in execution. Discussions (at Fort Benning and at NRC workshop) with individual soldiers who have undergone this training in the last several years revealed that the commitment to CB training is left to the unit commander's discretion and that training has been inconsistent, both within and across services. Thus, some equipment shortfalls may have been exacerbated by inadequate training and could be mitigated by more consistent and more stringent training (including training with coalition forces).

Although shortcomings in the training of individuals can be easily overcome, training commanders at all levels to react to a potential CB environment is quite difficult. Commanders must be taught to determine when protective gear is necessary, what levels of protection are necessary, and the timing and methods of removing MOPP gear safely. An audit conducted by the DoD Office of the Inspector General assessing unit training in chemical and biological defense revealed that commanders were not fully integrating CB defense into their unit training (DoD, 1998a). As a result, ''commanders could not adequately assess unit readiness to successfully complete wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions" (DoD, 1998a, p.1). Both commanders and individual soldiers must have a realistic idea of the risk in a given situation (see section "Understanding the Risk" below).

The current state of CB training has been reviewed in numerous documents (e.g., DoD, 1998a, 1999; Joseph, 1996), and DoD has acknowledged that the integration of safe, realistic CB defense, including defense against aerosol agents, into training simulations is essential. Models and simulations could be used to enable both units and commanders to understand an adversary's intent and CB capabilities and to enable trainees to visualize how CB capabilities might affect the battle space, defensive responses, and planned operations. Models and simulations would also enable commanders to apply CB defense training doctrine and leader-development training strategies in preparing their forces to maintain operational continuity and fulfill their missions in a CB environment. Currently, several engineering-level models represent the dynamics of CB contamination, but only a few robust representations of chemical effects (and almost none for biological effects) have been fully implemented in war games; and few analytical models have been used for training (DoD, 1999; Joseph, 1996).

There is inadequate guidance within the services or from operational chains of command that defines tasks, conditions, or standards for more complex CBW activities such as operational planning to minimize the potential effects of enemy NBC use...the commanders of units undergoing training essentially determine the scope and nature of play, if any, to be included in the scenarios by CTC [Combat Training Center] controllers and opposing forces (Joseph, 1996, p. 78).

Understanding the Risk

Commanders are much better able to assess the hazards posed by the familiar risks from ballistic weapons than from CB weapons. The lack of information concerning how CB agents affect health and at what concentrations they are dangerous has skewed the overall perception of risk and has led to DoD adopting the goal of complete CB protection with no, or minimal, casualties. Thus, the level of protection from CB threats is higher (100 percent) than the level of protection from ballistic threats.

The 100-percent protection level has resulted in overly conservative choices for protection against unrealistically high challenge levels. Protective equipment has been designed to meet CB challenges that are far greater than realistic battlefield threats. For example, many countries believed to possess CB capabilities may not have suitable delivery systems to create a sustainable threat of the magnitude against which the United States is currently defending (see Table 3-1 for service-specific requirements for liquid and vapor contamination levels) (Institute for Defense Analyses, 1999).

Table 3-1

Service Requirements for JSLIST.

Even though some enemies could contaminate a given target to this level, the requirement for percutaneous protection should not be determined on this basis. The requirement should balance inherent risk factors and trade-offs between the protection of the individual and the combat effectiveness of the force. The implicit assumption of maximum CB protection is that it will minimize casualties. In fact, the opposite may be true because a protective system that significantly encumbers the soldier will degrade the overall combat effectiveness of the unit (see Chapter 4). This degradation affects all units that don protective gear, regardless of whether or not their location has actually been targeted. The decrease in combat effectiveness across the larger force may result in more overall casualties than may have resulted from a lesser protective posture with less of an effect on combat performance.

Contamination is not usually uniform in a target area. Contamination levels are likely to be significantly higher than the challenge against which the United States currently defends in some areas but significantly lower elsewhere. In fact, the areas with the highest contamination densities will be closest to the burst of the munitions. Consequently, ballistic fragmentation effects are also likely to be highest in these same areas. Some analyses have suggested that the ballistics effects of bursting chemical multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rounds may have as much as 30 percent of the ballistics effects of a comparable high-explosive MLRS round (Battelle Memorial Institute and Charles Williams, Inc., 1999). This means that significant portions of those areas with 10 g/m² or greater liquid agent contamination densities would also be subject to lethal shell-fragment effects (Institute for Defense Analyses, 1999). Thus, chemical protective suits would be ineffective in these areas, regardless of the level of contamination.

Striking a balance between protection and performance will require that many factors be considered. Specifically, the intelligence community must assess the enemy's overall ability to deliver a CB agent on target. Planners need to know how many and what types of targets might be contaminated to the level against which the United States currently protects (Table 3-1), the delivery systems that might be used, and the enemy's resupply capabilities before the appropriate assessments can be made. As the number of U.S. forces and resources continue to decline, U.S. intelligence will have to provide these types of assessments so that the current totally risk-averse position can be adjusted to a realistic risk management strategy.

Current appraisals of the threat and current toxicological information are inadequate for proper evaluations of the health consequences of exposure, even with soldiers in MOPP 4 status. Evaluations of the protection afforded by various MOPP levels are based on estimates of the CB dose that can be delivered to an individual. Although some simulant studies have been conducted, they may not be universally applicable to all CB agents, especially aerosol agents (NRC, 1997b). The existing toxicological data on real agents are sparse. In recent reports, previous studies on the toxicity of chemical agents in humans and animals have been reevaluated to determine reference doses (NRC, 1997a, 1999e). However, these data are not reliable enough for the purposes of modeling and simulation for the following reasons: (1) not enough data have been collected; (2) the assays used to collect these data are not as sensitive as advanced methods; and (3) they do not show subtle effects. Therefore, modelers have determined that they do not have sufficient information on toxicokinetic factors, such as the uptake, metabolism, and excretion of CB agents, to predict risks and hazards accurately. These circumstances have led to an exaggerated perception of risk and a design for overprotection.

According to information presented at briefings and in a previous NRC report (e.g., Institute for Defense Analyses, 1999; NRC, 1985; U.S. Army SBCCOM, 1998), little evidence supports the hypothesis that low-level exposures to CB agents have long-term deleterious health effects. However, because of a lack of data, substantial doubts have been raised, and illnesses that cannot be medically diagnosed or attributed to conventional causes may be attributed to CB exposures (NRC, 1999b). Since FY 1996, DoD has dedicated $5 million to evaluating the chronic effects of low-level exposures to chemical agents (DoD, 1999). Studies have been under way since the first quarter of 1997 to develop highly specific and sensitive assay equipment that can be used in forward areas to detect and potentially quantify low-level exposures to chemical agents. According to the Executive Summary of the Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board Action Plan with Respect to the Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Committee (1997, p. 2),

Federal research requests for proposals include the possible long-term health effects of chemical and other hazards (including subclinical exposure to CW [chemical warfare] nerve agents)...[and there is] development of a strategic plan for research into the potential health consequences of exposure to chemical or other hazards, including low levels of chemical agents.

In May 1999, the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine published Technical Guide (TG) 230A, Short Term Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel, to address the health risks that may be experienced by deployed military personnel following temporary or short-term exposure to a number of toxic chemicals (U.S. Army CHPPM, 1999). These guidelines are based on a variety of effects, ranging from mild signs or symptoms and long-term delayed effects from low-level exposures, to more severe effects, such as death, from temporary high-level exposures. Commanders must be trained and evaluated on the appropriate use of these new guidelines. A second technical guidance document (TG 230B), which will address the risks associated with longer-term exposures (i.e., from 14 days to one year), is under development.

Findings and Recommendations

Finding. The battlefield areas with the highest contamination levels will also have the highest levels of ballistic fragmentation lethalities. Therefore, CB protective measures will be ineffective in these areas regardless of the liquid or vapor challenge levels. The threat from CB weapons relative to other battlefield threats is unknown.

Recommendation. The Department of Defense should reevaluate liquid and vapor challenge levels based on the most current threat information and use the results in the material requirements process and, subsequently, in the development of training programs and doctrine.

Finding. Little or no new funding is being provided for basic research on new technologies for physical protection and decontamination.

Recommendation. The Department of Defense should reprogram funds to alleviate the shortfall in basic research on new technologies for physical protection and decontamination.

Finding. Unit commanders receive little training related to assessing CB risks to their units, especially in determinating when, whether, and how much protective gear is necessary.

Recommendation. The Department of Defense should develop commander training protocols and/or simulations to assist unit leaders in making appropriate chemical and biological risk-based decisions.