Yuri Orlov

Dear colleagues and friends, I will discuss some nontrivial problems about the connection between human rights, especially in the USSR, and the preservation of peace.

My point of view on human rights and peace was and is based on the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Peace and security ride on the backs of three whales: disarmament, human rights, and trade.

Consider the relations among democratic countries in the West. (I include Japan in that term.) The nuclear supremacy of the United States immediately after World War II played a decisive role in establishing the current order in the Western world. But today, 40 years after that war, the United States is part of a large democratic system. Today it is hard to imagine that disagreements between Japan and the United States, or between the European Common Market and the United States, could lead to war.

Why is this true? In the first place, their mutual economic ties have become so vital for all of them that they share a stake in mutual prosperity and fear of an economic crisis in any country. (The Marxist thesis that the struggle for markets and for raw materials will inevitably lead to war among capitalist countries may have been true in the past. But it is no longer applicable, because of the intense growth of connections between their economies.)

Another reason is the much more important role public opinion plays now in matters of war and peace than it did 70 or even 40 years ago, before the exchange of ideas, information, and people became as free and extensive as it is today. Today, public opinion in the United States, Europe, and Japan would be against a war in any countries in the West.

We see, then, that the proliferation of intensive trade connections and the free flow of people, ideas, and information are effective safeguards for peace in the Western world. Thus, if undemocratic countries did not exist, the problem of nuclear disarmament could, I suspect, be easily resolved. In other words, I believe that the relations among democratic countries in the West offer a working model for international peace.

Let me now concentrate on the Soviet system. The problem of world peace and security would be significantly reduced if the USSR were an integral part of the Western world. But neither its political nor its economic system permits it to be integrated into that system. Some in the West feel we should concentrate only on questions of disarmament, since it is impossible or impractical for the West to influence internal development in the USSR. This is a serious argument; however, history has proved it wrong.

The USSR has changed in the 70 years of its existence, and since the death of Stalin it has, in general, changed for the better. Serious reforms were introduced by Khrushchev. Maybe the most serious reform with respect to the problem under consideration is that the Soviet Union has become a somewhat less closed society, that is, less hostile to the free flow of people, information, and ideas within its borders and across them. Before that, when it was a completely closed society, it was truly impossible to influence the USSR by peaceful means. But after the society became at least a bit open, it also became susceptible in some measure to external influence. And Soviet society in the course of the last 30 years has indeed become, little by little, increasingly susceptible to Western influence.

Probably the first explicit recognition in Soviet history of that influence was the acknowledgment by Ambassador Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna Conference, that the existence of political prisoners in the USSR complicates the relations of the Soviet Union with the West and that this was the main reason for the future release of about 200 such prisoners (The New York Times, January 16, 1987).

The political dissidents have made Soviet society less closed by publicizing facts about the USSR and by having an active relationship with Western scientists, political officials, journalists, and human rights groups. Indeed, it has been an explicit aim of some dissident groups in the USSR to publicize information about Soviet society, so the West would exert constructive pressure on the Soviet government. Now the Soviet government has itself created a bit more openness by informing the West about events in the USSR and, recently, by granting visas to and from the USSR. Those changes came about because of the Soviet desire to look better to the West.

The problem of openness in Soviet society cannot be considered purely an internal affair of the Soviet Union, because it has exceptional importance for the question of international security. The more closed Soviet society has been, the more generally hostile it has tended to be to other countries. Thus, both as a part and as a result of the deliberate isolation of that society for many decades, we Soviet citizens have been educated as if we were members of a great underground organization encircled by a hostile world. Even as we have been pronouncing fine words about peace, we have always meant peace among enemies.

Soviet citizens have not and do not receive accurate information about the policies of the U. S. government and the life of American citizens. For example, they are persuaded by Soviet propaganda that if the Soviet army had not entered Afghanistan, that country would have been turned into an American military base. I have heard that opinion expressed in many conversations with Soviet people. They forget that before the Soviet invasion, a communist government ruled Afghanistan. (Unfortunately, newspaper readers in all countries have short memories.)

(Laughter)

Openness in Soviet society is not only important for international security, it is also that aspect of human rights in the USSR which is most subject to the influence of Western society. The Soviet government at the present time is exceptionally interested in the improvement of its image in the West and in the development of scientific and technological contacts with the West. It is certain that the KGB will try to keep these contacts under its control, as it did in the past. Now, however, the situation depends on the West as well as on the KGB.

I emphasize that the USSR is now extremely interested in scientific contacts. That interest and the great interest of the West in security can form the basis for compromise and the development of a more open Soviet society. We must initiate a real campaign to encourage such openness, because if Soviet society were to become as open as the West, East-West tension would be substantially reduced and mutual security thereby increased.

I would like to make a proposal to begin that campaign—a proposal that the Soviet Union cannot reasonably object to. As you may know, in Europe exchange visits of school children among families of different countries have become common. These visits create a foundation for mutual understanding and for peaceful future relations between the countries involved. I believe we should press to have such exchange visits take place between the Soviet Union and the West. Soviet children would then, for example, be able to spend their vacations with American families and American children with Soviet families.

As for the contribution to openness that can be made by Western scientists and scholars: They can help open up Soviet society in the area of academic freedom. The aim should be to end the habit of the Soviet government and the KGB of viewing scientists as instruments of foreign policy.

The academic freedom of Soviet scientists and scholars is, I believe, an issue for academics everywhere, because scholars and, perhaps especially, scientists form an international community. Thus, for example, if Americans want to invite a particular Soviet scientist to a conference here or to send an American scientist to a conference there and the Soviet government does not give that scientist a visa, the Soviet authorities are indirectly violating the Americans' academic freedom as well as that of the Soviet scientists. If they persecute one of their scientists for his open expression of opinion, they are preventing Americans from sharing his ideas, and that is an indirect violation of their freedom.

Scientists should have complete freedom to express their opinion and complete freedom to communicate with each other without regard to frontiers. Of course, academic freedom is only freedom for an elite, but let everyone demand openness in his own field of activity. There is no need to fear that the Soviets will refuse to enter into an agreement on scientific contacts because of American defense of academic freedom as part of human rights. Although they might try bluffing in this regard, they have much more than Americans to gain from scientific contacts.

Another aspect of openness that is important for international security is a citizen's right to receive information about the military and foreign policies of his government and to criticize the actions of his government in these areas. Soviet citizens do not have this right. Openness within a country is more dependent on a government's internal policies and is less susceptible to the pressure of international public opinion than openness in relations with other countries. But there does exist one tested means of influence—the defense of individuals persecuted and prosecuted for the criticism of their governments.

With respect to defense of such Soviet scientists, I have heard the opinion that Western scientists have no justification as scientists for defending Soviet scientists who are being persecuted for criticism of their government rather than for their scientific views. Of course, scientist does have the right to avoid all questions other than strictly scientific ones. But it is my opinion that, in the modern world, a scientist should defend his colleagues who protest the military actions of their government. That is especially true when a Western scientist takes part in activities involving Soviet scientific organizations. Then he, himself, inevitably becomes involved in politics, since the USSR views and uses such organizations as instruments of politics.

By contrast with the Soviet Union, public opinion in the United States has sufficient power to force the government to cut short itary actions in “local conflicts.” Unfortunately, this takes time. I do not know what changes in American democracy are necessary for public opinion to be able to prevent rather than limit military actions. However, I know with certainty that, in the USSR, democratic control of military action is completely inadequate to the demands of international security. It is, indeed, virtually nonexistent.

The Soviets have prosecuted their citizens who have called for trust with the United States or spoken against Soviet military actions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan or spoken out against the Soviet part in the arms race. True, there is in the USSR a so-called official struggle for peace. For example, some Soviet physicians have been permitted to join International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. However, I do not know of any Soviet member of that organization who has publicly criticized the nuclear arms policies of his government.

I believe many of the Soviet members are silent because, lacking information, they believe that the United States is the sole source of the arms race. Others are silent, knowing that the Soviet government would consider any criticism an intolerable attack on its image. So the Soviet participation in the physicians' organization has made no demonstrable contribution to international peace. The only effect of Soviet participation has been on the Soviet government's image in the West (as the government intended), not on its military policies.

But do Soviet military policies, in fact, deserve criticism? Of course, the Soviet government does not want a new world war. Yet it has grabbed and continues to grab and keep one country after another by military force—which, by itself, is dangerous for the future of the world. Before Afghanistan, there was Czechoslovakia in 1968 and before that, Hungary in 1956. Before that, there was the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states and the division of Poland with Nazi Germany that marked the beginning of World War II. There was also the Winter War with Finland in 1940. No, the Soviet government cannot be called peaceloving. The world will therefore benefit when the Soviet Union grants its citizens the human rights to criticize their government's military policies.

In conclusion, I want to stress that, as a first approximation, the issue of human rights is independent of the issue of disarmament. Both issues are important for the cause of peace and international security. But to me it is plain that the democratization of the USSR in the sense that I have discussed earlier—the inclusion of the USSR in the Western system of democracies—is a necessary condition for real peace and security in the world. Scientists can help achieve it.

It is difficult, but possible, and it is important. A peace based on fear cannot be stable. Thank you.