Safeguarding U.S. agriculture from foreign animal diseases and protecting our food system require cutting-edge research and diagnostic capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have embarked on an important mission to replace the aging Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) with a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). When operational, this new facility would be the world's fourth biosafety level-4 laboratory capable of large animal research. It would serve as a critical world reference laboratory for identifying emerging and unknown disease threats, and would thus be a critical asset in securing the future health, wealth, and security of the nation.

DHS selected Manhattan, Kansas, as the site for the new NBAF after an extensive site-selection process that involved an environmental impact statement. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised concerns about DHS's analysis of the potential spread of foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDv), one of the most serious foreign animal disease threats. Congress directed DHS to conduct a site-specific risk assessment (SSRA) for the NBAF, instructed the National Research Council (NRC) to independently evaluate the SSRA, and prohibited obligation of NBAF construction funds until the NRC review was complete.

Congress mandated that DHS revise its SSRA to address shortcomings of the 2010 SSRA, directed the NRC to evaluate the updated SSRA (uSSRA), and again prohibited obligation of construction funds until the completion of the second review. The scope for both of these SSRA reports addressed accidental release of pathogens from the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas and excluded terrorist acts and malicious threats from its risk assessments. Evaluation of the Updated Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas is the evaluation of the final uSSRA.

Contents

• THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
• COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF THE UPDATED SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE NATIONAL BIO- AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY IN MANHATTAN, KANSAS
• BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES
• BOARD ON AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Summary
  • OVERALL ASSESSMENT
  • FINDINGS
  • LIMITED APPLICABILITY OF THE UPDATED SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT
  • CONCLUSIONS
• 1. Introduction
  • UNIQUE CAPABILITIES AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NATIONAL BIO- AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
  • PROPOSED SITE IN MANHATTAN, KANSAS
  • PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS
  • CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE AND STATEMENT OF TASK
  • COMMITTEE'S APPROACH TO ITS TASK
  • ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
  • REFERENCES
• 2. Evaluation of Design, Operations, and Response Planning as Related to the Risk Assessment
  • DESIGN PLANS
  • STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, PERSONNEL TRAINING, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING
  • REFERENCES
• 3. Evaluation of Risk Approach and Calculations
  • RISK MODELING FRAMEWORK
  • APPLICATION OF RISK METHODS IN THE UPDATED SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT
  • SPECIFIC CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
  • INPUT DATA AND PARAMETER ESTIMATES
  • CONCERNS ABOUT QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS PRACTICES
  • REFERENCES
• 4. Evaluation of Accident Event Modeling
  • OVERVIEW OF METHODS FOR ACCIDENT EVENT MODELING
  • COMMENTARY
  • TERMINOLOGY
  • LOGIC ERRORS AND EVENT TREES
  • DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURE PROBABILITIES AND REDUCTION FACTORS
  • GENERAL FINDINGS ON DATA INPUTS
  • MODELING OF CATASTROPHIC NATURAL HAZARDS
  • TORNADOES
  • EARTHQUAKES
  • REFERENCES
• 5. Evaluation of Fate and Transport Modeling
  • MODIFICATIONS IN USE OF THE MODEL AND PARAMETERS
  • SHORTCOMINGS IN THE APPLICATION OF SCIPUFF
  • SHORTCOMINGS IN MODELING AIRBORNE SPREAD IN THE NAADSM
  • REFERENCES
• 6. Evaluation of Epidemic Modeling
  • OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND ANALYSIS
  • SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
  • METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
  • REFERENCES
• 7. Evaluation of Economic Modeling
  • OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND ANALYSIS
  • INACCURATE DESCRIPTIONS OF METHODS AND ANALYSIS
  • INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION PROVIDED TO VERIFY RESULTS
  • PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL ANALYSIS
  • REGIONAL MODEL ANALYSIS
  • NON-INDEMNIFICATION COSTS
  • SUMMARY
  • REFERENCES
• 8. Evaluation of Biosafety Level 4 Assessment
  • INADEQUACY OF THE SEMI-QUANTITATIVE APPROACH
  • CONCERNS ABOUT BSL-4 ANALYSIS
  • CONCERNS ABOUT USE OF METHODS AND MODELS
  • REFERENCES
• 9. Overall Assessment, Findings, and Conclusions
  • OVERALL ASSESSMENT
  • FINDINGS
  • LIMITED APPLICABILITY OF THE UPDATED SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT
  • CONCLUSIONS
  • REFERENCES
• Appendixes
  • Appendix A Committee Biosketches
  • Appendix B Meeting Agendas and Lists of Public Participants

This study was supported by Task Order HSFLBP-11-J-00002/Contract HSHQDC-11-D-00009 between the National Academy of Sciences and Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.