Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003 Sep 2;100(18):10564-7. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1731324100. Epub 2003 Aug 14.

Abstract

The recent threat of bioterrorism has fueled debate on smallpox vaccination policy for the United States. Certain policy proposals call for voluntary mass vaccination; however, if individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to self-interest, the level of herd immunity achieved may differ from what is best for the population as a whole. We present a synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. This shortfall results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

  • Game Theory
  • Health Policy*
  • Humans
  • Mass Vaccination
  • Smallpox Vaccine / administration & dosage*
  • United States
  • Vaccination*

Substances

  • Smallpox Vaccine